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The Comrade's
CAP
The new East European governments have been keen to 
make a clean break with the past. In fact, they've been keen 
to forget the past. Paul Hockenos contends that this 
collective amnesia bodes ill for a democratic political 
culture in the old Soviet bloc.
ilan Kundera opens The Book of 
Laughter and Forgetting with a parable 
about the treatment of history under 
communism. On a snowy winter's 
day in 1948, Czech communist leader Klement 
Gottwald posed for a photo with his inner circle. 
Next to him stood Comrade Clementis, who took 
off his own fur cap and set it on Gottwald's bare 
head. After the purges four years later, Clementis 
was air-brushed out of the photo. All that 
remained of him was his cap on Gottwald's head.
When the revolutions of 1989 brought down the Eastern 
bloc dictatorships, they swept away the facade of historical 
half-truths, distortions and lies upon which the ruling elites 
grounded their legitimacy. If "the struggle of man against 
power is the struggle of memory against forgetting", as 
Kundera puts it, then in 1989 memory was victorious.
The close of a discredited historical epoch, however, poses 
new questions about remembrance and forgetting, about 
the new relationship between 'man' and power. In a region 
so steeped in historical tragedy as Eastern and Central 
Europe, the form of democracy that evolves is implicitly 
informed by the post-communist systems' relation to their 
pasts.
In a word, at least, all of Europe's new member-states 
concur that the dissolution of single-party rule constitutes 
a clean break with the communist era. But like the will to 
erase a bad dream, the East Europeans have tried to put the 
last four decades behind them as if they had never existed. 
To the detriment of their societies, the people of the former 
Eastern bloc have concentrated their collective energy on 
forgetting.
Of the many aspects of political transition, the Central and 
East Europeans have taken little pain to confront the legacy 
of stalinism in their countries. Certainly, previously sup­
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pressed knowledge about the political gulags and the Ges­
tapo tactics of the secret police have done much to under­
line the totalitarian core of even the 'soft' regimes such as 
Hungary. Yet that examination has stopped drastically 
short of a searching investigation into the past. As quickly 
as Romanian revolutionaries changed Lenin Strada to 
Strada Demokratiei, the complex questions of respon­
sibility and guilt were brushed aside to clear the way for 
the new era. The necessity of a penetrating Aufarbeitung der 
Geschichte, or coming to terms with the past, is nowhere on 
the young democracies' agendas.
Immediately after the Eastern bloc regimes tumbled, even 
the top nomenklatura professed that they had been closet
democrats all along, pushing relentlessly for change from 
within the structures of power. For the discontented 
populations, the fact that the state outlawed political op­
position and ruthlessly crushed popular uprisings served 
as a handy and not altogether unconvincing alibi for their 
own political conformism. Admittedly, communism 
pressed the average citizen into active complicity with the 
system, unless she or he was prepared to sacrifice a normal 
life. As party member, low-level bureaucrat or obedient 
fellow-traveller, the average person struck his or her com­
promise with power. In former East Germany today, week­
ly revelations about the co-operation of even leading 
figures in the pre-1989 underground opposition with the 
secret police has exposed the shocking totality of society's 
complicity. In hindsight, the Vaclav Havels and the Adam 
Michniks stand out as the precious few.
This broad collaboration with the powers-that-were ex­
plains the readiness to skip over a full coming-to-accounts 
with the past. With the single exception of former East 
Germany, the calls of yesterday's dissidents to open the 
secret police files have run into brick walls. Nor is it simply 
a matter of politics that most of the democratic dissident- 
led parties fared poorly at the polls. The majority of the 
populus not only identifies better with the careerist-tumed- 
nationalist, but finds its conscience better protected there, 
too.
It is that sort of bad conscience which demands that some­
body from the very top be indicted for the crimes of the 
systems as a whole. The trials of Bulgaria's former dictator 
or a handful of Ceausescu's secret police are aimed at 
scapegoating a few of the ringleaders and putting the issue 
to rest. Perhaps the pinnacle of absurdity is the Federal 
Republic's demand that former German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) President Erich Honecker be retrieved 
from his death bed (at the moment in the Chilean Embassy 
in Moscow) to face trial for the state's shoot-to-kill order 
along the former German-German border. If Honecker is 
convicted, the implication is that the majority is absolved 
from responsibility for the years of dutiful voting in the 
GDR's showcase elections.
Czechoslovakia's far-reaching new law that bans all mem­
bers of the 'old structures' from a public office for five years 
purports to solve the problem of the past with a simple 
administrative stroke of the pen. The blanket 'collective 
guilt' of the nomenklatura (including reform-minded 
Prague Spring communists such as Alexander Dubcek) 
again effectively translates into society's 'collective 
innocence'.
The release of the individual (or at least most individuals) 
from accountability lays a precarious basis for a new 
democratic political culture. Most importantly, it fails to 
replace the individual's consciously hypocritical acquies­
cence to state power with an active ethic of civic respon­
sibility or political obligation. Despite the introduction of 
multi-party electoral democracy, the implication persists 
that the system and its ruling elite alone shoulder the 
burden of social accountability. In Hungary, for example, 
the Germans are to blame for the Hungarian holocaust, the 
'Russians' for Soviet communism and now, in some circles,
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the Jews for the failures of capitalism. Turn-outs for local 
elections in Hungary have dropped from 40% to 20% and, 
in some recent votes down below 15%. There are more than 
a few Hungarians who would happily revert to the good 
old days of Kadarism, when Hungarian President Janos 
Kadar (1956-1986) offered the 'cheeriest barracks' in East­
ern Europe a relatively high standard of living in return for 
its political passivity.
‘The nationalist revivals 
throughout the region have  
prom pted sweeping 
historical revisions. ’
The illusory tabula rasa also undermines the need for society 
to reflect upon the consciousness that evolved under the 
conditions of the past 40 years. Since communism, as well 
as 'socialism', has been forever assigned to history's 
dustbin, there appears no pressing need for society to come 
to terms with just what that system was or how it continues 
to manifest itself in the present. In depoliticised societies, 
the totalitarian thought-structures of the old systems fuel 
today's chauvinism. In the political sphere, a familiar 
authoritarianism, intolerance and provincialism, persist in 
the reigning power structures—although now under the 
name of nationalism, 'communism's opposite'. And, by 
definitively closing the book on the past, the language of 
socialism also remains trapped in stalinism's wreckage. 
Thus, the possibility of social democracy is also neatly 
nipped in the bud.
The denial of the communist era has led political forces in 
Central and Eastern Europe in two general directions. In 
liberal democratic circles—those most strongly identified 
with the dissident tradition—the 1989 revolutions are seen 
as the chance to embark upon a qualitatively new political 
future. Their model is contemporary western democracy, 
something that most of them admit has never existed in its 
modem form in Eastern Europe. The second and stronger 
tendency is a conservative nationalism that views the com­
munist era as a Soviet-imposed interruption of a national 
democratic tradition which had flourished prior to World 
War Two. The nationalists' rhetoric is of a 'return to the 
past', to the interwar period when Hungarians ruled Hun­
gary and Poles ruled Poland.
Unfortunately, today's elected mlers have sought refuge in 
historical myths no less perilous than those of their com­
munist predecessors. The nationalist revivals throughout 
the region have prompted sweeping historical revisions 
which uncritically glorify the nation's past from the Middle 
Ages to the present. Amid a new vacuum of power and 
ideology, these embellished histories remain one of the few 
threads underpinning the legitimacy of many of the post­
communist governments. With economic collapse and 
political instability looming, liberals too have stooped to 
tap that national sentiment. The deficit of alternative politi­
cal ideas has presented conservative nationalists with an 
open field to define the nascent political culture.
The contention that the national culture stands firmly in the 
tradition of modem democracy enables political conserva­
tives to anchor their own undemocratic ideologies in 
whitewashed national precedent. As the much-maligned 
object of communist propaganda, the fairytales of lost na­
tional glory are easily marketed. In Poland, the interwar 
second Republic and its strong-arm leader, Marshal Jozef 
Pilsudski, is today held up as a model of Polish democracy. 
In fact, Pilsudski came to power in a bloody putsch four 
years before Poland's first free elections and presided over 
gross human rights violations, the brutal crushing of strikes 
and virtual civil war with the national minorities.
Hungary's conservative ruling coalition, led by the Hun­
garian Democratic Forum (HDF), harks back to the populist 
political culture of the country's Christian Course during 
the 1920s and 30s. Picking up where that era left off, the new 
government restored the power of the Catholic Church and 
the unabashed exaltation of Hungarianism. The weak in­
terwar democracy serves as the model for a style of rule 
today in which parliamentary opposition and public 
criticism are at best resentfully tolerated. Complete with the 
ugly chauvinism of a bygone age, it is an historical brand 
of political conservatism considerably less sophisticated 
than its modem counterparts in Western Europe.
After the humiliation of communism, the positive appraisal 
of the interwar years soothes bruised pride. First, it absolves 
the nation from the reality of its often ignominious prewar 
and wartime past. Second, it bolsters the logic that 'we, the 
nation' were always democrats and communism an in­
flicted aberration. Under the supra-collective cloak of the 
nation, individuals are relieved of responsibility for their 
actions and inaction.
Any criticism of the popular revisionism therefore strikes a 
sensitive nerve, making it difficult for real debate over 
domestic nationalism to enter political discourse. Anti- 
Semitism, for example, is alive and well in Hungary. In die 
government-friendly media, HDF populists continue to 
manipulate the anti-Jewish sentiment that proved so 
damaging to the intellectual-led free Democratic Party in 
the 1990 election. Yet in Hungary anti-Semitism itself is not 
discussed in terms of posing an impediment to democracy. 
Rather, it is criticism of the government's anti-Semitic pos­
turing which sometimes finds its way into public discus­
sion that supposedly jeopardises the country's 'return to 
Europe'. The governing coalition's supporters brand their 
critics as 'un-Hungarian' and 'unpatriotic' for libelling 'the 
nation' (of which they consider themselves the sole repre­
sentative) and discrediting Hungary in the eyes of the 
international community. This modus vivendi enables the 
regime to continue to stir anti-Semitic feelings with im­
punity.
Elsewhere, governments and oppositions alike have bound 
their fragile democracies to heritages with even darker 
pasts. In Romania, the rehabilitation of the World War Two 
fascist military dictator, Marshal Ion Antonescu, has near- 
unanimous public consent. The entire spectrum of political
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Earties are virtually at each others' throats to claim the >gacy of "Romania's greatest national hero". On 1 June 
1991, the 51st anniversary of Antonescu's execution, the 
Romanian parliament observed a minute's silence for its 
nation's misjudged son. "After 44 years, history has finally 
allowed the Romanians to shed a tear and light a candle 
for Ion Antonescu," wrote the leading democratic opposi­
tion daily, Romania Libra.
During Antonescu's rule (between 1940 and 1944) 400,000 
Jews and tens of thousands of gypsies lost their lives. In 
Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt describes the hor­
rors of the Romanian concentration camps as "more 
elaborate and more atrocious than anything in Germany". 
She writes that, in August 1941, before the Final Solution 
orders were given, Goebbels complained to Hitler that 
"Antonescu proceeds in these matters in a far more radical 
fashion than we have done up to the present".
Typically, the revisionists kindle the image of the 
nationalist leader as the anti-communist patriot, the mar­
tyred saviour of their misunderstood and long-suffering 
country. It was Antonescu, Romanians point out, who won 
back Romania's eastern territories in Bessarabia, annexed 
by the Soviet Union in 1940 under the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
pact. The marshal's partnership with the fascist Iron Guard 
and Nazi Germany was simply a matter of national Real- 
politik, they say, the unlucky fate of being squeezed be­
tween the Soviet Union and the Axis alliance. As for the 
Romanian Holocaust, they argue, it is a lie that Antonescu 
killed the Jews. In fact, he saved them. And the gypsies, 
well...
'Nationalist historians 
helped rouse the hatreds 
that had lain dormant for 
years in Yugoslavia. ’
Intellectuals, too, have jumped on the nationalist 
bandwagon. For many, the new religion serves as con­
venient therapy for their years of hack scholarship under 
communism. The nationalist fervour in Romania has 
fueled virulent anti-Semitism, a thriving ultra-right, 
bloody ethnic violence in Transylvania, and regular 
pogroms against the gypsies. Yet, even in opposition 
circles, intellectuals have shirked a principled stand. The 
editor of Romania's leading liberal intellectual journal 22 
Wrote: "Romanians are a temperate, tolerant and 
hospitable people. The presentation of Romania as a 
country where the extreme right flourishes unhindered, as 
Well as other such charges, is deeply unpatriotic. "Else­
where, even some of the most critical intellectuals argue 
that, with the priority of economic restructuring at hand, 
there simply "isn't time" for an historical Aufarbeitung.
In Yugoslavia, the manipulation of national myths and a 
cut-throat war of histories paved the way for the grisly 
conflict that has raged over the past year between Serbs
and Croats. With self-serving and partial versions of the 
1940s, nationalist historians helped rouse the passionate 
hatreds that had lain dormant for years in communist 
Yugoslavia.
The legacy of World War Two is a painful one for all 
Yugoslavs. Of the nearly one million people killed, as many 
died in inter-ethnic strife among themselves as died fight­
ing the nazis. Today, the Croats insist that the number of 
Serbs, Gypsies and Jews massacred in the camps of the 
quisling Axis-allied Croatian state was only a tiny fraction 
of that claimed by the communists. Rather, Serbian royalist 
Chetniks were the real butchers. Croatia's President Franjo 
Tudjman (elected in 1990) made his name in the 1960s as a 
maverick historian who charged that only 30,000 people 
perished at the hands of the Ustashe fascists. One of 
Tudjman's first acts in office was to order that the Square 
for the Victims of fascism in the capital of Zagreb be 
renamed the square of the Croatian Giants. In the 
president's nationalist speeches, the words and symbols of 
the brutal wartime state appear again and again.
For Serbian politicians, meanwhile, Tudjman's nationalist 
party is synonymous with the Ustashe itself. Radical his­
torians have stoked the fires, arguing that the bloodthirsty 
Ustashe slaughtered well over one million Serbs alone. The 
real memories and exaggerated horror stories have com­
bined to strike the fear of God into the Serbian minority in 
Croatia. It is the legacy of the genocidal Ustashe state, the 
minority insists, that has driven them to take up arms 
against an independent Croatia.
The political vacuum in post-communist Central and East­
ern Europe is one explanation for the ready embrace of 
rightwing ideologies of the inter-war era. Nor was the 
legacy of those nations' fascist collaboration constructively 
addressed, however, in the tense climate of post-war East­
ern Europe. Since communism supposedly represented the 
final victory over nationalism and fascism, the new states 
simply denied the sources and continuities of those 
ideologies in society. At the same time, under the guise of 
socialist rhetoric, the ruling elites ruthlessly manipulated 
nationalism from above and perpetuated many of the 
totalitarian structures of fascism in the communist sys­
tems. When those historical nationalist ideologies raised 
their heads in the form of anti-communist opposition, the 
regimes quashed the 'counter-revolutionary7 movements 
and imprisoned their leaders.
Nor can the majority of the Western Left get off scot-free 
from its responsibility for the situation in post-communist 
Eastern Europe. The Left's muted criticisms of the Eastern 
bloc dictatorships only contributed to the tarnished reputa­
tion of socialism of any kind in Eastern and Central Europe. 
Western Leftists wax indignant about the East Europeans' 
refusal to differentiate between a democratic socialism and 
stalinism, when they themselves never drew a clear line.
But, it seems, that part of history is quickly forgotten too.
PAUL HOCKENOS is a Berlin-based journalist. He is work­
ing on a book on the Right in post-Cold War Eastern Europe.
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